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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The question before us in this matter is whether a 
statement in a debt collection letter to the effect that 
forgiveness of the debt may be reported to the Internal Revenue 
Service constitutes a violation of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692 et. seq.  The 
District Court concluded that the statement found in dunning 
letters sent by Appellee Midland Credit Management Inc., 
(“Midland”) to Appellants Robert A. Schultz, Jr., and his wife, 
Donna (the “Schultzes”) could not constitute a violation of the 
FDCPA, and dismissed their putative class action complaint.  
We disagree, and hold that the statement in question may 
violate the FDCPA.  Accordingly we will reverse the dismissal 
of this action and remand for further proceedings.  
I. 
On four dates in 2015—July 21, August 24, September 
2, and October 23—Midland sent letters to Robert Schultz, Jr., 
attempting to collect three separate outstanding debts that had 
been outsourced to Midland for collection after Robert had 
defaulted on them.  On August 24 and October 23, 2015, 
Midland sent Donna Schultz separate letters likewise 
attempting to collect a separate outstanding debt from her.  
None of the Schultzes debts exceeded $600.  Each letter 
offered to settle the amount of indebtedness for less than the 
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full amount owing.1  Four of the letters noted that “[i]f you pay 
your full balance we will report your account as Paid in Full.  
If you pay less than your full balance, we will report your 
account as Paid in Full for less than the full balance.”  (App. 
24, 30, 32, 36).  All of the aforementioned letters contained the 
following language: “We are not obligated to renew this offer.  
We will report forgiveness of debt as required by IRS 
regulations.  Reporting is not required every time a debt is 
canceled or settled, and might not be required in your case.”  
(App. 17).  Since the Department of the Treasury only requires 
an entity or organization to report a discharge of indebtedness 
of $600 or more to the IRS, and because each of the debts 
linked to the Schultzes was less than $600, the Schultzes 
claimed that the inclusion of the foregoing language was 
“false, deceptive and misleading” in violation of the FDCPA, 
(App. 18), which broadly prohibits the use of any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the 
collection of any debt.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  
On July 20, 2016, the Schultzes filed a putative class 
action complaint on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated asserting violations of the FDCPA.  Midland moved 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss on the ground 
that the Schultzes failed to plead a plausible violation of the 
FDCPA.  The District Court granted Midland’s motion on May 
                                              
1  All but one of the letters offered a 10% discount on 
the indebtedness if prompt payment was made.  For example, 
the July 21, 2015 letter to Robert offered to settle the amount 
then due—$389.59—for $350.64 if that amount was paid by 
August 20, 2015.  (App. at 24).  The October 23, 2017 letter 
to Donna offered a 40% discount on the amount then due, 
$479.83.  (Id. at 36). 
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8, 2017, concluding that the Schultzes indeed failed to 
plausibly allege a violation of the FDCPA because the 
language set forth in the dunning letters was not “deceptive” or 
“otherwise violative of the FDCPA.”  (App. 8).  In the District 
Court’s view, the language:  
[did] not threaten the reader of the 
letter with a legal action that 
cannot be taken, nor [did] the letter 
include any false or deceptive 
statements designed to enhance its 
ability to collect the outstanding 
debt.  Rather, Defendant’s letter, 
when read in its entirety by the 
least sophisticated consumer, 
[could] only have one 
interpretation. That interpretation 
is simply that, in certain 
circumstances, debt settlement 
and/or discharge] may be 
reportable to the IRS, not all 
settlements and/or discharges are 
reportable, and that the subject 
statement may not be applicable to 
the reader. 
(App. 8-9).2  The Schultzes timely appealed the District 
Court’s ruling to our Court.    
                                              
2 Midland had also filed a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration in this matter because it maintained that the 
claims raised in Mr. Schultz’s original complaint, concerning 
the Synchrony Bank/Lowe’s indebtedness of $389.59, were 
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II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We afford plenary review to a district court’s order 
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Black 
v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2016). 
III. 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 after noting the 
“abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair 
debt collection practices by many debt collectors.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692(a); see also Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 
453 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Act’s purpose is twofold: It seeks not 
only to eliminate abusive practices by debt collectors, but also 
“to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using 
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged.”  Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (quoting  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692(e)).  
The portion of the FDCPA relevant here, § 1692e, states 
that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation or means in connection with the 
                                              
subject to an Arbitration Clause in the pertinent credit card 
agreement.  (App. 63).  The District Court, after granting 
Midland’s dismissal motion, declined to address Defendant’s 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, owing to mootness.  (Id. at 9).  
Because we are remanding, this issue should be reviewed in 
the first instance by the District Court. 
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collection of any debt.”  The section goes on to describe the 
following as violations of the FDCPA: 
The threat to take any action that 
cannot legally be taken or that is 
not intended to be taken.   
  . . . 
The use of any false representation 
or deceptive means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt or to 
obtain information concerning a 
consumer.  
Id. §§ 1692e(5), (10).  Whether a collection letter is “false, 
deceptive, or misleading” under § 1692e is determined from 
the perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor.”  Brown, 464 
F.3d at 453.  In Brown, we articulated the standard for 
deception under § 1692e as follows: 
The least sophisticated debtor 
standard requires more than 
simply examining whether 
particular language would deceive 
or mislead a reasonable debtor 
because a communication that 
would not deceive or mislead a 
reasonable debtor might still 
deceive or mislead the least 
sophisticated debtor. This lower 
standard comports with a basic 
purpose of the FDCPA: as 
previously stated, to protect all 
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consumers, the gullible as well as 
the shrewd, the trusting as well as 
the suspicious, from abusive debt 
collection practices. 
Id. at 454 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
plaintiff’s burden is low under this objective standard.  She 
need not prove that she was confused or misled, but only that 
the least sophisticated consumer would be.  Jensen v. Pressler 
& Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 On appeal, the Schultzes argue that by including the 
language, “[w]e will report forgiveness of debt as required by 
IRS regulations,” Midland presented a false or misleading view 
of the law—one designed to scare or intimidate the Schultzes 
into paying the outstanding debts listed on the debt collection 
letters even though Midland knew that any discharge of the 
Schultzes’ debt would not result in a report to the IRS.  We 
agree.   
Here, the reporting requirement under the Internal 
Revenue Code is wholly inapplicable to the Schultzes’ debts 
because none of them totaled $600 or more, and IRS 
regulations clearly state that only discharges of debt of $600 or 
more “must” be included on a Form 1099-C and filed with the 
IRS.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1(a).3  By including the 
reporting language on collection letters addressing debts of less 
than $600, we believe that the least sophisticated debtor might 
                                              
 3 Significantly, “multiple discharges of indebtedness of 
less than $600 are not required to be aggregated.” 26 C.F.R. 
§1.6050P-1(a)(2).   
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be persuaded into thinking that the discharge of any portion of 
their debt, regardless of amount discharged, may be reportable.   
Midland argues that, in order to conclude that a 
consumer would be misled by this statement, one would have 
to read the first sentence in isolation while paying no attention 
to the second qualifying statement—i.e., that “[r]eporting is not 
required every time a debt is canceled or settled, and might not 
be required in your case.”  (App. 17).  However, even with this 
qualifying statement, the least sophisticated debtor could be 
left with the impression that reporting could occur.  Indeed, this 
is precisely what happened in the Schultzes’ case—there was 
no possibility of IRS reporting in light of the fact that the debt 
was less than $600, but use of the conditional “might” 
suggested that reporting was a possibility.   
Midland argues that if we were to adopt the Schultzes’ 
interpretation of the language contained in the letters, we 
would essentially give credence to a “bizarre or idiosyncratic” 
interpretation of the letters, which does not preserve “a 
quotient of reasonableness and . . . a basic level of 
understanding and willingness to read with care.”  Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2000).  For 
Midland, the use of the conditional “might” should signal to 
the least sophisticated debtor that only under certain 
circumstances will reporting occur.  The problem with this 
argument, however, is that, for the Schultzes, under no set of 
circumstances will reporting ever occur.  As we held in Brown, 
even if the language in a letter is true, it can still be deceptive 
where “it can be reasonably read to have two or more different 
meanings, one of which is inaccurate.”  464 F.3d at 455 
(citation omitted).  And the facts here are not so different than 
those in Brown, such that our holding here should be different.  
In Brown, a debt collector suggested that if a debtor did not pay 
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her outstanding debt within five days it could result in a lawsuit 
against her.  Id. at 451-53.  While the debt collector had the 
authority to bring such a suit, because five days passed and it 
failed to do so and rarely had done so in the past, the threat of 
legal action was considered deceptive in violation of the 
FDCPA.  Id. at 455 (stating that “it would be deceptive under 
the FDCPA for [the debt collector] to assert that it could take 
an action that it had no intention of taking and has never or very 
rarely taken before” and that “where the debt collector ‘has 
reason to know there are facts that make the action unlikely in 
the particular case, a statement that the action was possible 
would be misleading’” (citation omitted)). 
The FDCPA sweeps broadly—it is not just outright lies 
that it condemns.  As the Ninth Circuit held in Gonzales v. 
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 
2011), anytime a debt collector includes “language in a debt 
collection letter [that] can reasonably be interpreted to imply 
that the debt collector will take action it has no intention or 
ability to undertake, the debt collector that fails to clarify that 
ambiguity does so at its peril.”  Similar to Brown, although 
even more egregious, Gonzales dealt with a debt collector who 
had bought up years of debts owed to health clubs, all of which 
were more than seven years old, and thereby pursuant to the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, ineligible for reporting to a credit 
reporting agency.  Id. at 1059.  In its collection notices, the 
following statement was made: “[I]f we are reporting the 
account, the appropriate credit bureaus will be notified that this 
account has been settled.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Because 
there was no possible way that all of the debts could be legally 
reported, the Ninth Circuit deemed this statement misleading.  
Id. at 1063.  The Court went on to say that “[w]here the law 
places affirmative limits on a debt collector’s actions, the debt 
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collector that ‘goes perilously close to an area of proscribed 
conduct takes the risk’ that it will be liable under the FDCPA 
for misleading consumers.”  Id. at 1063 (citation omitted).  
And, of particular note, the Court also stated “[c]onditional 
language, particularly in the absence of any language clarifying 
or explaining the conditions, does not insulate a debt collector 
from liability.”  Id.; see also Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland 
Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2008) (“in 
certain contexts a completely accurate statement can be 
deceptive or misleading”).4   
                                              
4 Several district courts in our Circuit have found 
similar collection letter language to be sufficiently deceptive 
to survive a motion to dismiss.  See, e.g., Disla v. Northstar 
Location Servs., LLC, No. 16-cv-4422, 2017 WL 2799691, at 
*1, *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017) (concluding that the statement 
“Barclays Bank Delaware is required to report the amount of 
the debt forgiven to the Internal Revenue Service” could be 
misleading because the “language does not accurately reflect 
26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1 because it discusses no exceptions to 
the reporting requirement”) (emphasis omitted); Medina v. 
Allianceone Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No. 16-4664, 2017 WL 
220328, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017) (finding that the 
statement “Department Store National Bank will report 
forgiveness of debt as required by IRS regulations” to be 
deceptive because “[a] reasonable recipient of the letter could 
rightly interpret as to mean not when but because” and 
thereby understand the IRS reporting requirement to be 
mandatory even though exceptions may apply); Good v. 
Nationwide Credit, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 3d 742, 744, 748 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014) (finding the statement that “GE CAPITAL RETAIL 
BANK is required to file a form 1099C with the Internal 
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The Seventh Circuit has held that “a dunning letter is 
false and misleading if it ‘impl[ies] that certain outcomes might 
befall a delinquent debtor, when legally, those outcomes 
cannot come to pass.’”  Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 
880 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lox v. CDA Ltd., 
689 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2012)).  Thus, it is not merely the 
inclusion of a lie but also incomplete or inapplicable language 
in a collection letter that may form the basis for a potential 
FDCPA violation.5   
 Finally, we would be remiss if we did not address two 
cases that Midland submitted in support of its position after 
oral argument: Ceban v. Capital Management Services, L.P., 
No. 17-CV-4554 (ARR) (CLP), 2018 WL 451637, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2018), and Antista v. Financial Recovery 
                                              
Revenue Service for any cancelled debt of $600 or more” to 
be deceptive because exceptions may apply). 
 
5 Midland argues that including tax consequence 
language in a letter can be helpful to the consumer, as it gives 
the debtor more information to make an informed choice 
about what to do with a debt.  Yet, as Midland also concedes, 
the Second Circuit has already held that “a debt collector 
need not warn of possible tax consequences when making a 
settlement offer for less than the full amount owed to comply 
with FDCPA.” Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 
786 F.3d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2015).  Furthermore, the 
suggestion that forgiveness of the debt may be reported to the 
IRS could compel the unsophisticated debtor to pay the full 
amount of the indebtedness to avoid having to deal with the 
potential tax ramifications when debt forgiveness is reported 
to the IRS.  
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Services, No. 2:17-cv-3567 (WJM), 2017 WL 259771, at *1 
(D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2018).  In Ceban, the district court held that the 
statement “[t]his settlement may have tax consequences” was 
not false, deceptive, or misleading.  “[T]he statement simply—
and correctly—put plaintiff on notice that a settlement ‘may’ 
have tax consequences.  Ceban, 2018 WL 451637, at *7.  In 
Antista, the court held that we must presume that even the least 
sophisticated debtor can distinguish between “may” and 
“must” when it comes to any statement regarding the IRS 
reporting requirement.  Antista, 2018 WL 259771, at *3.   
Neither case is persuasive.  First, Ceban dealt with a 
debt that was over $600.  Therefore, the district court’s analysis 
was written in reference to a completely different set of 
circumstances than those applicable to the Schultzes in this 
case.  Second, even if we accept Antista’s statement that the 
least sophisticated debtor can distinguish between “may” and 
“must”, the circumstances in our case demonstrate that the 
language at issue references an event that would never occur, 
distinguishing it from Antista.  Here, it is reasonable to assume 
that a debtor would be influenced by potential IRS reporting 
and that, if that reporting cannot come to pass, it could signal a 
potential FDCPA violation regardless of the use of conditional 
language.  
 While we recognize that Midland, like many debt 
collection companies, uses form letters when contacting its 
debtors, we must reinforce that convenience does not excuse a 
potential violation of the FDCPA.  We therefore are obligated 
to reverse the order of the District Court granting Midland’s 
motion to dismiss, as a reasonable juror may find a violation of 
the FDCPA in this instance.  
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IV. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will reverse the May 8, 
2017, Order of the District Court as we find that the Schultzes 
have pled sufficient factual allegations that state a plausible 
claim upon which a court may grant relief under the FDCPA.  
We will therefore remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
